Asia & Pacific

Changing Commercial Policy in Japan During 1985-2010
In this paper the authors examine the changing nature of Japan's commercial policy over the last 25 years while reviewing Japan's changing structure of trade, FDI and economy that underlay policy changes. They argue that until the late 1990s Japan adopted a two-track approach of relying on multilateral liberalization under the GATT/WTO and open regionalism under Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the one hand and on the bilateral trade relationship with the US on the other. Japan's more recent commercial policy focuses on bilateral and plurilateral economic partnership agreements particularly with - but not limited to - East Asian economies. They argue that agricultural sector liberalization is key to the further integration of Japan with the Asian and global economies.
20 May 2012

Agency Problems, Product Market Competition and Dividend Policies in Japan
This study investigates whether product market competition reduces agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Japan. In particular, we examine firms' dividend policies in competitive versus concentrated industries. In a large sample of Japanese firms we find that firms in more competitive industries pay more dividends, are more likely to increase dividends, and are less likely to omit dividends. Furthermore, the impact of firm-level agency problems on dividend payouts is weaker in highly competitive industries. The results suggest that product market competition can be an effective industry-level governance mechanism that can force managers to disgorge cash to outside investors.
20 May 2012

Evaluating GDP Forecasting Models for Korea
This paper argues that Mongolian members of parliament have an incentive to over-spend on smaller projects that bring benefits to specific geographical localities and to under-spend on large infrastructure that would bring economic benefits to Mongolia on the whole. The incentive for the former is that members of parliament internalize the political benefits from the provision of particular, targeted benefits to specific communities. The disincentive for the latter is that large infrastructure carries a political risk because the political faction in control of that particular ministry would have access to huge rents and become politically too powerful.
20 May 2012